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Acronyms
• Application specific integrated circuit (ASIC)
• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
• Agile Mixed Signal (AMS)
• ARM Holdings Public Limited Company (ARM)
• Asynchronous assert synchronous de-assert 
(AASD)
• Automotive Electronics Council (AEC)
• Block random access memory (BRAM)
• Built-in-self-test (BIST)
• Bus functional Model (BFM)
• Clock domain crossing (CDC)
• Combinatorial logic (CL)
• Commercial off the shelf (COTS)
• Complementary metal-oxide semiconductor 
(CMOS)
• Configurable Logic Block (CLB)
• Configuration Management (CM)
• Controller Area Network (CAN)
• Correct Coding Initiative (CCI)
• Design for Reliability (DFR)
• Design for Security (DFS)
• Design for Test(DFT)
• Design for Verification (DFV)
• Digital Signal Processing (DSP)
• Direct Memory Access (DMA)
• Double Data Rate (DDR3 = Generation 3; DDR4 =  
Generation 4)
• Edge-triggered flip-flops (DFFs)
• Electronic Design Automation (EDA)
• Electronic Design Interchange Format (EDIF)
• Equipment Monitor And Control (EMAC)
• Equivalence Checking (EC)
• Error-Correcting Code (ECC)
• Evolutionary Digital Filter (EDF)
• Field programmable gate array (FPGA)
• Floating Point Unit (FPU)
• Global Industry Classification (GIC)
• Gate Level Netlist GLN)
• Global Route (GR)
• Hardware Design Language (HDL)
• High Performance Input/Output (HPIO)
• High Pressure Sodium (HPS)
• High Speed Bus Interface (PS-GTR)
• Input – output (I/O)
• Intellectual Property (IP)
• Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C)
• Internal configuration access port (ICAP) 
• Joint test action group (JTAG)
• Kilobyte (KB)
• Logic equivalence checking (LEC)
• Look up table (LUT)
• Low Power (LP)
• Low-Voltage Differential Signaling (LVDS)
• Megabit (MB)
• Memory Management Unit (MMU)
• Microprocessor (MP)
• Multi-die Interconnect Bridge (EMIB)
• MultiMediaCard (MMC)
• Multiport Front-End (MPFE)
• Negated AND or NOT AND (NAND)
• Not OR logic gate (NOR)
• On-chip RAM (OCM)
• On-The-Go (OTG)
• Operational frequency (fs)
• Peripheral Component Interconnect Express 
(PCIe)
• Phase locked loop (PLL)
• Physical unclonable function (PUF)
• Place and Route (PR)
• Power on reset (POR)
• Processor (PC)
• Random Access Memory (RAM)
• Register transfer language (RTL)
• Reliability (R)
• Reliability of BRAM (RBRAM)
• Reliability of configuration (RConfiguraiton)
• Reliability of configurable logic block (RCLB)
• Reliability of global routes (RGL)
• Reliability of hidden logic (RHiddenLogic)
• Reliability of operation (Roperation)
• Reliability of parametrics (Rparametrics)
• Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)
• Serial Quad Input/Output (QSPI)
• Static random access memory (SRAM)
• System Memory Management Unit (SMMU)
• System on a chip (SOC)
• Temperature (Temp)
• Transceiver Type (GTH/GTY)
• Transient width (τwidth)
• Ultra Random Access Memory (UltraRAM)
• Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter 
(UART)
• Universal Serial Bus (USB)
• Very High Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC)
• VHSIC Hardware Design Language (VHDL)
• Watchdog Timer (WDT)
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Motivation
• The United States government has identified that ASIC/FPGA hardware 
circuits are at risk from a variety of adversary attacks.  
• As an effect, system security and trust can be compromised.
• The scope of this tutorial pertains to potential vulnerabilities and 
countermeasures within the ASIC/FPGA design cycle.
• The presentation demonstrates how design practices can affect risk for an 
adversary to:
– Change circuitry,
– Steal intellectual property, or
– Listen to data operations.
• An important portion of the design cycle is assuring the hardware is working 
as specified or as expected.  This is accomplished by extensively testing the 
target design.
• It has been shown that well established schemes for test coverage 
enhancement (design-for-verification (DFV) and design-for-test (DFT)) can 
create conduits for adversary accessibility.  
• As a result, it is essential to perform a trade between robust test coverage 
versus reliable design implementation.
ASIC: Application specific integrated circuit FPGA: field programmable gate array
3
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Goals
• Explain conventional design practices and how they 
affect risk : design-for-reliability (DFR), design-for-
verification (DFV), design-for-test (DFT), and design-
for-security (DFS).
• Review adversary accessibility points due to DFV 
and DFT circuitry insertion (back door circuitry).
• Describe common engineering trade-off 
considerations for V&V versus adversary threats. 
• Discuss risk analysis.
V&V: Verification and validation
4
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Field Programmable Gate Array 
(FPGA) Basics
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The FPGA Design Process 
• Goal: A final product requires an end-user to acquire 
an FPGA base-array from a manufacturer.
• After acquisition, the end-user will customize the 
FPGA base-array with a specified design.
• Process:
– Manufacturers create base-arrays that contain existing 
configurable logic cells plus other complex intellectual property 
(IP).
– End-Users acquire FPGA base-arrays with the intent to map 
designs into the devices’ existing logic cells.
– The output of the end-user’s mapping process is used to 
configure (program) the FPGA’s existing logic cells.
– The FPGA is configured by:
• Downloading a bitstream to the FPGA’s configuration 
memory (SRAM or Flash), or
• Blowing configuration fuses (anti-fuse). 
SRAM: static random access memory
6
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Vulnerabilities and The FPGA Design 
Process
• Vulnerabilities can be created during the 
manufacturer design cycle and the end-user design 
cycle that persist in their final products.
– These vulnerabilities create avenues for adversary infiltration.
– It is important to note that potential adversary access does not 
definitely lead to system malfunction or information leakage.
– Subsequently, a combination of threat, implemented mitigation, 
and outcome must be studied.
• There are design choices that cause systems to be 
less vulnerable in some areas, while increasing 
vulnerabilities in others.
• Trade-offs are made to determine if the design 
choices should be implemented; and if mitigation is 
required.
7
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FPGA Manufacturer Design Cycle 
versus End-User Design Cycle
• Design of the FPGA base-array (ASIC design flow) maps logic 
onto a blank slate… flexible design choices.
• An end-user’s FPGA design maps into the target base-array’s 
existing logic cells… limited design choices.
• ASICs require device fabrication – additional challenges:
– Reliability of fabrication (fab) process:
• Stuck-at-faults
• Transistor lifetime
• Routing (net) lifetime
• Process variations
• Device timing and other electrical parametrics
– Requires high levels of V&V post fabrication for product assurance.
• Benefit of using existing logic: once users buy the device, 
they do not have to go through a costly fabrication process 
with its additional reliability challenges.  Manufacturer is 
expected to perform post-fab assurance.
• Con of using existing logic… area, power, and general 
performance are lessened. 
8
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Vulnerabilities within The FPGA End-
User Design Cycle 
• End-users buy FPGA devices (base-arrays):
– Many of the manufacturers’ vulnerabilities can propagate to the 
end-users.
– It is important to understand these vulnerabilities so that the end-
user can add the appropriate mitigation if necessary.
• When evaluating vulnerabilities to adversary 
infiltration, it is essential to assess the full 
ecosystem of the design cycle (personnel, 
equipment, storage schemes, data transfer, etc.)
• However, the scope of this presentation is design.  
Only design specific vulnerabilities, threats, and 
countermeasures (mitigations) will be discussed.
Not every susceptibility is a vulnerability!
9
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Understanding What Is Inside of An FPGA
CLBs
BRAM
GR 
Control
HardIP
Configurable logic block: (CLB) 
Block random access memory: (BRAM)
Intellectual property: (IP); e.g., micro processors, digital signal processor blocks (DSP),PUF, Key control, etc,…
Global Routes: (GR)
Reliability: R
Reliable operation depends on a variety of parameters.
Complex routing logic 
everywhere.
10
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Cannot Evaluate 
Susceptibilities/Vulnerabilities without 
Understanding What Is Inside An FPGA
• Data-path glitching 
• Change of state
• Global route glitching
• Configuration corruption
• Insertion or deletion of expected circuitry
• Current jumps or increases (contention)
• Single event upsets
Each FPGA has different susceptibilities.  Important to understand 
mission requirements to determine vulnerabilities, differentiate 
per FPGA device, and mitigate appropriately.
Configuration
End-user data-path logic (CLB)
Global routes (GR)
Embedded (hidden) logic
11
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Example: FPGA Component Libraries -
Basic Designer Building Blocks
• Combinatorial logic 
blocks 
– Vary in complexity
– Vary in block I/O
• Sequential Memory 
blocks (DFF) 
– Uses global Clocks 
– Uses global Resets
– May have mitigation
• Device I/O
– Direction
– Standard
12
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Building Blocks: Susceptibilities and 
End-User Mitigation
• Designer building blocks are 
replicated thousands of 
times within an FPGA device.
• Although it is possible for an 
adversary to change a cell, 
due to the V&V performed by 
the manufacturer and the 
widespread usage, it is an 
unlikely point of attack. 
• Countermeasures: End-user 
V&V with parametric analysis 
(current, hotspots, signal 
leakage, etc.)
13
Verification and validation (V&V)
13
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HDL Mapping and FPGA Configuration
FPGA MAPPING
Configuration defines 
arrangement of pre-existing 
logic via programmable 
switches:
Functionality (logic cluster)
Connectivity (routes)
Programming Switch Types:
anti-fuse: One time 
Programmable (OTP)
SRAM: Reprogrammable (RP)
Flash: Reprogrammable (RP)
14
Configuration technologies 
vary and are managed 
differently.
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Example: Mapping Combinatorial Logic into 
Configuration
• Output is affected by inputs 
after gate delay (tdly).
• Used for computing or 
routing.
• FPGAs provide blocks of 
combinatorial logic (library 
components)… blocks vary 
per manufacturer.
I1 I2 I3 I4
Lookup Table LUT 
1
0
Xilinx LUT uses
SRAM type Configuration.
Actel RTAXs C-
CELL requires 
anti-fuse to 
select gate 
mapping.
15
Xilinx LUT uses
Pass transistors.  THIS IS NOT 
CONFIGURATION SRAM.
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Configuration Vulnerabilities
• anti-fuse: 
– Configuration is a hard process.  
– It cannot be changed once programmed.  
– Susceptibilities/vulnerabilities: imaging (reverse engineering), 
complex process bugs, or lifetime deficiencies.
• Flash: 
– Configuration is stored in non-volatile memory (persists after the 
removal of power).
– Can be changed.
– Susceptibilities/vulnerabilities: imaging (reverse engineering) and 
bitstream manipulation.
• SRAM
– Configuration is stored in volatile memory (does not persist after the 
removal of power).
– Requires another component for volatile storage or for remote 
reconfiguration. 
– Can be changed.
– Susceptibilities/vulnerabilities: imaging (reverse engineering) , 
bitstream manipulation, additional component for configuration data 
storage, potential configuration data transmission, Single Event 
Upsets (SEUs).
16
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The FPGA Design and Verification Process 
from The User’s Perspective
Synthesis
Place & 
Route (PR)
Create and Transfer Configuration to FPGA
Gate Level 
Netlist (GLN)
Simulator, 
Formal, 
STA, and 
CDC
Board Level 
Verification GLN+ PR+ Timing
Hardware Description Language 
(HDL), IP integration, or Schematic
Q
QSET
CLR
DMUX
17
Map+Translate
(3rd party or 
Manufacturer tool)
Manufacturer 
tool
Functional 
Specification
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LOGIC LOGIC
LOGIC LOGIC
FPGA End-User Mapping into Existing 
Logic with Place and Route
Combinatorial
FPGA 
Block
DFF 
FPGA 
Block
MUX
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Hardware design language (HDL)
18
To be presented by Melanie Berg  at the Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), McLean, VA May 3trd 2018
FPGA Design is Hardware
• Reminder: HDL stands for Hardware Description 
Language.
• Misperception that HDL is similar to writing software
– The electrical characteristics of the circuit are generally 
overlooked and designs are improperly implemented.
– Verification (state-space coverage and transition) is not 
performed correctly.
– Identification of vulnerabilities are in accurate.
• Bottom line: in order for the end-user to create a 
reliable product, hardware concepts must be 
incorporated into the design process.
19
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Design Methodology and Reliable 
Operation Considerations
Metastability
Number of Clock 
Domains Clock Balancing
Reset Structure
Power (Hot-spots)
Area
I/O Standard 
Selection
I/O Rings and 
Pin Switching 
(ground-bounce)
Long Traces 
(charge sharing) Creation of 
Latches versus 
Edge-triggered 
flip-flops
Static Timing 
Analysis … 
Setup/hold time 
violations (race 
conditions)
Synthesis tool 
interpretation of HDL
HDL: hardware description language
20
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Design-for-Reliability (DFR):
Synchronous Design
To be presented by Melanie Berg  at the Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), McLean, VA May 3trd 2018
Introduction to Reliable Design 
(Synchronous Design)
• This section establishes requirements and best-
practice guidelines for creating reliable digital designs.  
• Why go through the trouble?
– Due to advancements in technology and the resulting increase in 
device resources, the complexity of digital designs has grown 
exponentially.  
– In order to bound and manage the complexities of design, engineers 
must follow practices that yield deterministic system behavior.  
• The design-for-reliability methodology described in this 
presentation is used at NASA and other critical-
application design houses across the world.
22
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Synchronous Design and Deterministic 
Behavior  
• Deterministic behavior = controllability and observability.  
• Deterministic behavior is essential for functional and 
physical testability:
– Can cause conduits to vulnerabilities if not strictly followed:
• Bad design can create untestable logic (blind spots).
• Bad design can cause the system to easily become unstable.
• Bad design can leave inputs and outputs unprotected.
• Bad design can cause parametric vulnerabilities.
– Can cause conduits to vulnerabilities if deterministic mechanisms 
are not mitigated.
• Deterministic behavior is easier for an adversary to reverse 
engineer.
• Design solutions for determinism can cause massive 
disruption (e.g.: clocks and resets).
• Design solutions for testability can cause access points for 
adversaries.
23
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There are many rules a designer must follow for 
reliable system behavior.  Some are contradictory 
to the concept of security.
Solution: mitigate those components.
To be presented by Melanie Berg  at the Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), McLean, VA May 3trd 2018 25
Synchronous Design Building Blocks: Flip-
Flops (DFFs) and Combinatorial Logic (CL)
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Synchronous Design Data Path 
Components
• Design data-paths are constructed of:
• Combinatorial Logic (CL)
• Edge Triggered Flip-Flops (DFFs)
• All DFFs are connected to a clock.
• Clock period: tclk
• Clock frequency: fs
Clock Tree
The premise of synchronous design is to compute and hold 
in a deterministic manor.
26
tclk
tclk = 1/fs
To be presented by Melanie Berg  at the Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), McLean, VA May 3trd 2018
Edge Triggered Flip Flops... Creating 
Deterministic Boundary Points
In order to create precise boundary points of state capture, Latches
are NOT allowed in Synchronous designs.
Master: 
Clock Low: Transparent
Clock High: Hold
Slave: 
Clock Low: Hold
Clock High: Transparent
Output will only change at rising 
edge of clock.
D input must be settled by rising 
edge of clock.
27
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• Latch is checking its input the entire time the 
clock is low.
• Edge triggered DFF only samples data exactly at 
clock edge.
Why are Edge Triggered DFFs Considered 
Boundary Points and Are Considered 
Deterministic?
28
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Synchronous System Data Paths: 
StartPoint DFFs → EndPoint DFFs  
))1(()( −= TStartDFFsfTEndDFF
“Cone of Logic” 
TT-1 T+1
• Combinatorial logic create 
delay (tdly ) from StartPoints 
to EndPoints.
• Endpoints capture only at 
clock edge.
tdly tclk
29
Every DFF has a cone of logic.
To be presented by Melanie Berg  at the Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), McLean, VA May 3trd 2018 30
Synchronous Design…Timing and Data 
Capture with Static Timing Analysis Basics
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Static Timing Analysis (STA) Basics 
Various delays within a Synchronous design:
Concept… when will data arrive at a DFF or an Output?
D   Q Output Delay
Output Delay
Clock
Skew
Data Delay
Clock Delay
Data Delay D   Q
Clock
Data1
Data2
Data Delay
Input Delay
DFF to DFF 
Delay
Output Delay
tdly < tclk - overhead
31
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Static Timing Analysis (DFF to DFF)
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
1 Clock Cycle
Clock
DFF to DFF Boundary with 
Combinatorial Logic
Ga
te
 
De
lay
1 ns
2.5 ns
1 ns
2 ns
3 ns
1.5 ns
1.5 ns
5.5 ns
7.5 ns
• Longest Path: 14 ns - Clock must have a 
period longer than 14 ns + overhead 
(temperature, voltage, and process variation)
• Shortest Path : 10ns
Longest Path: 14ns… Clock must have a period longer 
than 14ns + overhead (temperature, voltage, pr cess 
variation, and clock jitter).
32
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Clocks (Skew, Jitter, and Clock Domain 
Crossings)
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Clock Tree – Clock Connected to every 
DFF
• Synchronous Design rule:
– All Clocks are on a balanced clock 
tree.
– FPGA – use the provided clock tree 
buffers (global routes)
• This minimizes skew from DFF 
to DFF.
• However, clock tree buffers are 
not perfect.
– They are very good for closely 
placed DFFs.
– However, there is significant skew 
from DFFs that are placed far apart.
• Race conditions (or hold time 
violations will occur if skew is 
not controlled.
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Clock Jitter
35
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Clock Skew
• Skew: it is the measurement of the difference in 
clock arrival time seen at one DFF compared to 
another DFF 
• Can cause a synchronous design to become 
asynchronous due to set-up and hold violations
• Clock tree must be balanced to avoid skew –
beware of tree connections – should only be to a 
DFF clock pin (I.e. can not feed combinatorial 
logic).
• Designs that don’t use balanced clock trees will 
most likely contain unpredictable behavior.
36
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STA: Deterministic Data Capture… 
Incorporating Skew and Jitter
tsu
tHOLD
Data Launch from DFF1
Data arrival at all DFFs must be stable between setup time (tsu) and hold time (th) 
… or there is potentially metastability in the capturing DFF.
clock
tdly: Data Delay through 
combinatorial logic and 
routes.
Q
QSET
CLR
D
DFF1 DFF2
tdly
tclk Q
QSET
CLR
D
Data Capture  is Deterministic when:
tdly<tclk-(tsu+tskew+tmargin)
37
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Synchronous Data Capture… No Clock 
Skew
tdly
Data launched from DFFa
New Data (after tdly) 
as seen by DFFx
tclk > tdly+tsu+tmargin-tskew
tskew < tdly+tHOLD+tmargin-tskew
Max
Min
Both Equations must be 
satisfied at all times.
Destination
Source
tdly
tclkq
DFFX tsu DFFX tHOLD
38
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Synchronous Data Capture… Tskew>0
tskew > tdly+tHOLD+tmargin-tskew
Min delay equation is violated.  
Race conditions will occur.tdly
tdlytskew
39
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Solution to Help Control Clock Skew: 
Global Clock Trees
• Balanced clock trees are available to the end-user in 
all modern day FPGA devices. 
• It is the designer’s responsibility to avoid corrupting 
tree (global route) balance.  
• Maintaining balance adheres to the synchronous 
requirement of using minimally skewed clocks.
40
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Designer Guidelines for Clocks in 
Synchronous Designs… Maintain Balance
• Avoid introducing unacceptable noise levels by forcing the clock 
input pin (or other clock source) is in close proximity to the clock 
buffer.
– If the pins are too far apart, the net will be too long.  Long nets can 
cause issues with capacitance, crosstalk, and transmission line 
effects.
– Designers should consult the manufacturer’s data sheet.
• If a clock tree buffer is connected to the clock pin of FFs, then it 
cannot connect to any other type of logic or pin. 
• Clock gating must be done prior to the clock tree buffer and in a 
glitch free implementation:
– Clock gating is not recommended.  However, if necessary, build a 
glitch-free circuit that switches clocks such that clocks end/start on 
the same edge.  If implemented, the best practice is to switch clocks 
while circuitry is in reset.
– A favorable alternative to clock gating is to use FF enables when 
possible, though it depends on the circuit and required fan-out.
41
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Metastability
• Cause:
– Introducing an asynchronous signal into a synchronous (edge 
triggered) system... Or 
– creating a combinatorial logic path that does not meet timing 
constraints.
• Effect:
– Flip-flop (DFF) clock captures signal during window of vulnerability.
– DFF output Hovers at a voltage level between high and low, causing 
the output transition to be delayed beyond the specified clock to 
output (tCO) delay.
• Probability that the DFF enters a metastable state and 
the time required to return to a stable state varies on the 
process technology and on ambient conditions.
• Generally the DFF quickly returns to a stable state.
However, the resultant stable state is not deterministic.
42
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Metastability Timing Diagram 
(Clock Domain A to Clock Domain B)
tco
tHOLD
tsu
Destination Clock B
Asynchronous 
Input violates tsu
Metastable output settles to 
new value after tco
Metastable output settles to old 
value after tco
D     Q
OutputInput
Clock Setup time: tsuHold time: tHOLD
Clock-to-Output: tco
Destination DFF
D     Q
D     Q
Source DFF Clock A
Destination DFF Clock B
Cause:
Effects:
Exaggerated tco for demonstration.
43
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No Metastability Timing Diagram 
(Clock Domain A to Clock Domain B)
tco
tHOLD
tsu
Destination Clock B
Asynchronous 
Input violates tsu
Output settles to new 
value after tco
Output settles to old 
value after tco
Cause:
Effects:
Exaggerated tco for demonstration.
Clarification, If a signal is unstable within the setup 
and hold window, the resultant may or may not go 
metastable.  However, the resultant will be 
nondeterministic.
44
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Solution: Metastability Filter
• System requires protection from metastability.
• Incoming signal is clocked in Domain A.
• Destination signals are clocked in Domain B.
• Filter: Use a capture DFF and at least one protection DFF.
– Both filter DFFs are clocked in the capture domain.
– The first DFF is expected to go metastable.
– The second DFF is used to protect the rest of the system from potential 
metastable output.
• However, there is no guarantee that the second DFF will be 
immune to metastability. Metastability filters have a mean time 
between failure (MTBF).
MTBF = e
c1×fDataA×fclkB
tslack/c2
D    Q D    Q D    Q
Capture Protection
Clock A Clock B
• Mean time between failure (MTBF)
• C2 and C1 are process dependent constants.
• fclkB is the capture clock domain frequency.
• fDataA is the maximum data switching frequency.
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Slack Time (tslack) between Metastability 
DFFs: Destination Clock Domain
tdly
tsu
Data launch from 
DFF1
Data arrives at 
DFF2
tslack
Destination clock B
• Nets and combinatorial logic add delay.
• Delay reduces slack time.
• More slack = more time for metastability to settle.
• Metastability filter rule: no combinatorial logic between 
metastability filter DFFs; and connection net length 
must be minimized.
MTBF = e
c1×fDataA×fclkB
tslack/c2
D    Q D    Q
Capture
DFF1 DFF2
Protection
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Synchronous Design Resets
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Reset Circuitry
• Just like the clock – a reset will go to 
every DFF.
• Within a reliable synchronous design, 
carefully thought-out reset circuitry is 
crucial. 
• However, very often reset circuits are 
over-looked and the appropriate 
planning does not occur. 
• Improper use of asynchronous resets 
has led to metastable (or unpredictable) 
states. 
• Resets must be kept in a reset-active-
state for a significant amount of time.
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Data Qout
Clk
Reset
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Asynchronous Resets
• No clock is necessary – DFFs respond to an active 
reset immediately.
• No problems exist as the system goes into reset 
because all DFFs will eventually enter their reset state 
(i.e. a deterministic state space is reachable).  
• The predicament occurs when the system comes out 
of the reset state.    
• If an asynchronous reset signal is released near a 
clock edge, it is possible for the flip flops to be 
become metastable, or come out of reset relative to 
different clock edges.  
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Example: Problem Coming Out of 
Asynchronous Resets
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
1 0 1
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
1 0 0
DFF comes out of RESET early 
compared to the first two DFFs.
DFFs 
during 
RESET
DFFs after 
release of 
RESET
Clock
RESET Non deterministic RESET 
recognition at DFF because switch 
is too close to clock edge.
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Asynchronous/Synchronous Resets
• Solution: Use Asynchronous Assert Synchronous 
De-assert (ASSD) Reset circuit
• Such a design uses typical metastability filter 
theory. Diagram is Active Low.
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Metastability Filter 
1
Buffer
Flip Flops are 
able to 
asynchronously 
go into RESET
Flip Flops come out 
of RESET 
synchronously
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ASSD Resets
• Upon the release of the reset signal, the first 
Flip Flop is not guaranteed to correctly catch the 
release of the reset pulse upon the nearest clock 
edge .
• At most the next clock edge.  
• It is also probable that the first Flip Flop will go 
metastable.  
• The second Flip Flop is used to isolate the rest of the 
circuitry from any metastable oscillations that can 
occur when the reset is released near a clock edge 
(setup/hold time violation).
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ASSD Diagram
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Synchronous Resets
• Purely synchronous resets are very popular within 
the commercial industry.  
• Synchronous resets require a clock to enter reset 
state.
• Synchronous resets are consequently less sensitive 
to glitches and Single event upsets (SEUs) than 
ASSD.
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
RESET
M
U
X
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Data-
path
“0”
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Synchronous Resets Disadvantages
• Adds latency to data-path because of required multiplexer 
(MUX).
• Can potentially damage parts on the board during power 
up/down because of required clock.
• It is highly recommended to implement ASSD reset circuitry for 
critical applications.
• However, if there are no sensitive components that the 
FPGA/ASIC is feeding, the synchronous approach is sufficient.
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
RESET
M
U
X
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Data-
path
“0”
55
To be presented by Melanie Berg  at the Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), McLean, VA May 3trd 2018
Presented Aspects of DFR (synchronous 
design) reflect how to create deterministic 
behavior in complex circuitry.
No design is complete until it goes through a 
rigorous verification and validation process.
Challenge: complex designs are difficult to 
test.  
Design-for-verification (DFV) and Design-for-
testability (DFT)
56
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Design-for-Verification (DFV)
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What Is DFV?
• The intention of DFV is to enhance V&V coverage.
• DFV is limited to V&V tests during the design phase:
– Simulation
– Emulation
• Conventional DFV has three major categories:
– Additional logic insertion that is used to force states during 
testing.
– Assertion placement in VHDL/Verilog/RTL to enhance internal 
visibility and real time reporting during simulation.
– Modular design strategies:
• Divide and conquer – design is broken into smaller more 
manageable pieces. 
• Plug and play – V&V testing doesn’t rely on big pieces of 
design to be finished.  Modules can be tested with models of 
surrounding environment (bus functional models or system 
level C models).
RTL: register transfer language
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Example: DFV Used for A Common 
Design Bug
Trigger upon 
event
Wait for 1 
million sub-
events
Respond
Bit 19
Bit 18
Bit 17
Bit 16
Bit 15
Bit 14
Bit 13
Bit 12
Bit 11
Bit 10
Bit 9
Bit 8
Bit 7
Bit 6
Bit 5
Bit 4
Bit 3
Bit 2
Bit 1
Bit 0
Should create a counter 
with 20 bits (DFFs).
Number of 
states=2^20=1,048,576
What happens if Bit 19 
gets optimized away by 
synthesis?
Counter will 
never count to 1 
million and the 
response will 
never occur!!!!!!
• Verification goal: guarantee trigger occurs as expected.
• Might be difficult to simulate 1 million sub events.
• DFV: test mode enables the counter to be loaded with any 
number to reduce simulation time.
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DFV: Modular Design Strategies
• Test harnesses are created 
to mimic a design; and to 
perform simulations.
• Eventually final versions 
of models are expected to 
be simulated in an 
interactive (real time) 
environment.
• DFV takes advantage of 
the modular concept.
– Use of bus functional 
models (BFMs).
– Interchange modules and 
their BFMs in the simulation 
test environment.
Module 
A
Module
B
Module 
C
Test 
Harness
BFM is a high level model 
of a module.
BFM
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Design-for-Test (DFT)
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What Is DFT?
• DFT is used for post-manufactured devices.
• Generally implemented in an ASIC design and is inserted prior to 
place and route.
• It can be used to test manufacturing defects and can be used to 
perform functional testing.
• DFT is similar to DFV: controllability and observability.
• FPGA base-arrays contain DFT logic:
– Some DFT circuits can be implemented by the end-user.
– Some DFT circuits is hidden logic and is disabled prior to end-user base-
array acquisition.
• Conventional DFT methodology:
• Insert logic to change between normal operational mode and test 
mode.  Requires a test mode pin and a mux added to the DFFs.
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
clock
Data in MUXData inScan data in
clock
Scan test mode
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DFT Process
• Place into test mode:
– Test mode pin is enabled.
– Connections are changed such that DFFs are placed into a shift 
register.
– System is clocked. Test data are serially shifted into the test shift 
register (controllability).
• Place into normal operation mode:
– Test mode pin is disabled.
– Connections are changed such that DFFs are placed into normal 
operation mode.
– System is clocked.
• Place into test mode:
– Test mode pin is enabled.
– Connections are changed such that DFFs are placed into a shift 
register.
– System is clocked. Test data are serially shifted out of the test 
shift register (observability).
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DFT Connectivity: Normal Operation to 
Test Mode
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Q
QSET
CLR
D
Data 
input
SDI
SDO
Data 
output
Data 
output
Data 
output
STM
STM: Scan test mode 
SDI: Scan data in
SDO: Scan data output
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Design-for-Security (DFS)
To be presented by Melanie Berg  at the Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), McLean, VA May 3trd 2018
What is DFS?
• Hardware DFS pertains to design strategies that 
reduce the risk of adversary infiltration throughout 
the full design ecosystem.
• The major concerns for risk and countermeasure 
application pertain to the potential for adversaries 
to:
– Steal intellectual property:
• Counterfeiting 
• Obtaining knowledge of system
– Add or delete Malicious circuit (trojan) 
– Perform side channel attacks: 
• Stealing hardware key information
• Listening for specific operation
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Primary Design Cycle Vulnerabilities
Access
zAcquisition
Design Data Base
EDA tools Electronics/IT
Mostly External 
threats except for 
Personnel making 
acquisitions.
External or internal threats.
Design Cycle Preparation Design Cycle and Deployment
EDA Tools IP Cores
Personnel
Electronics/IT
Information
Personnel
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Learned Accessibility … Actor Finds 
Gaps in Mitigation
• Adversary learns the 
system under analysis 
including mitigation.
• Adversary tries to detect or 
create gaps in mitigation.
• Adversary attacks system 
via gap.
• Must be taken into account 
in risk analysis.
• Will additional layers or 
dynamic layers of 
mitigation reduce risk?
• This action can be modeled 
in traditional game theory.
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Gaps in Mitigation:
Channels of Vulnerability and 
Circumstances 
Access
Acquisition
Learn/spy
Block Corrupt
Steal
Destroy/Loss of operation
Block
Destroy/Loss of operation
Blind
Different mitigation strategies are 
required (depending on 
vulnerability) when differentiating 
threat via access points or 
acquisition.
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Accessibility into Internal Design Elements: 
Multiple Layers of Mitigation
Data 
Storage
Data 
Handling
Personnel
RTL
EDA Tools
Gate level 
net-list
Bit stream
Acquisition also contains paths to 
these design elements.
Access
Actor has broken through 
initial  Access mitigation. IP 
Parametrics: 
power area temp
I/O
Fault 
Mitigation
Memory
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Determining System Risk
• Each step within the design flow can be depicted 
using acquire/mitigate or access/mitigate game theory 
models.
• In order to assess system vulnerably, the design must 
be evaluated:
– Information (at each step of the design flow) is gathered regarding 
design implementation.
– Design implementation is evaluated according to mission 
requirements, threat, and best practices.
– Risk is determined from gathered information and assessments.  
Search for gaps in mitigation.
Cannot perform risk analysis without proper 
gathering of design information
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Note Mitigation Application and 
Strength Must Be Carefully Assessed
• Risk assessments are 
complex, but they are a 
necessity. 
• Piling on mitigation can add 
risk.
• Mitigation complexity might 
have hidden modes that are 
blind to the review team or 
unreachable by the EDA tools:
– System lock out,
– Unwarranted self-destruct,
– Flags that ease adversary’s 
learning phase.
Access
Mitigation eats 
access to all!
When Mitigation becomes a threat!
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DFS and DFR
• One aspect of trust and security is to assure that 
operations are at all times as expected… nothing more… 
nothing less.
• System complexity has increased such that the required 
assurance process is infeasible.
• Lack of V&V coverage increases the risk of being unable 
to identify malicious circuitry insertion.
• However, there are techniques that can enhance 
assurance and hence reduce risk.
– DFR is the process of creating deterministic designs.
– The deterministic operation is a product of the discrete nature of 
synchronous design.
– Accordingly, following strict DFR rules enhances system V&V.
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DFS versus DFV and DFT
• The insertion of test modes requires external control and 
provides external visibility.
• This has been termed backdoor accessibility.
• As a result an adversary can gain access to the system and do 
the following: 
– Change or disrupt the operational state.
– Run test vectors to gain knowledge of the device.
• FPGA base-arrays provide backdoor access.  In order to avoid 
adversary infiltration: 
– All test-pins (backdoor inputs and outputs) should be either tied down on the 
board or strongly controlled by reliable circuitry.
– If pins are tied down, the end-user loses access to device internal visibility 
and control.
– If pins are not tied down and are accessible by other circuitry:
• Protection keys should be used to obtain accessibility.
• Keys should be dynamic in nature.
• Data encryption should be applied (also is a side channel attack 
countermeasure).
• Protocols of accessibility should be established.
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Summary
• The United States government has identified that 
ASIC/FPGA hardware circuits are at risk from a variety of 
adversary attacks.  
• As an affect, system security and trust can be 
compromised.
• The tutorial covered how design practices can affect the 
risk for the adversary to:
– Change circuitry
– Steal intellectual property
– Listen to data operations
• A description of design practices and how they affect risk 
was presented: design-for-reliability (DFR), design-for-
verification (DFV), design-for-test (DFT), and design-for-
security (DFS).
• Information pertaining to common countermeasures and 
risk analysis was provided. 75
